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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1965, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Griswold v.
Connecticut,' invalidating a nearly century old statute that criminalized the
use of contraceptives, even by married couples, "for the purpose of
preventing conception."2
Griswold injected new life into the largely3
dormant notion that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
could effectively protect substantive individual rights, beyond those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, against state legislative action.
Decades earlier, the Court had abandoned the use of a high level of due
process scrutiny in cases presenting challenges to statutes regulating
economic activity;4 most observers thought that this meant the end of any

1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
2. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958)).
3. "No state shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. In Lochner v. New York, the Court held that legislation that limited "[t]he general right to
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attempt to subject the substance of legislation to anything more than low
level "rational basis" review, except when enumerated rights were involved,
or in a limited number of cases presenting equal protection claims.'
Griswold, however, meant that a heightened standard of review would be
applied to a new category of cases.
But Griswold left questions about the source and the scope of this newly
strengthened right unanswered. The justices in the majority found that
"privacy" was a value entitled to special constitutional protection, but they
could not agree on a single rationale for that conclusion.6 In addition, the
several opinions among the majority left the boundaries of the privacy right
undefined.7 Many would read Griswold and conclude that it was limited to
protection of the marital relationship.8 Others viewed its scope more
broadly.9

make a contract" would be subjected to careful scrutiny to determine whether or not it was "a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State." 198 U.S. 45, 53, 56 (1905).
Over the next three decades, over 170 state statutes were declared unconstitutional applying the
Lochner criteria. See BENJAMIN WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 154

(1942).
By 1938, however, the Supreme Court repudiated Lochner in United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish., 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Writing for the Court in Parrish, Chief Justice Hughes declared that "[rlegulation which is
reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due process."
300 U.S. at 391. This sentence captures the essence of what today is commonly referred to as the
low-level "rational basis" test. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970).
5. In one of the most famous footnotes in the history of constitutional jurisprudence, the Court,
in Carolene Products, stated that a higher level of scrutiny might be appropriate in three contexts:
"when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution ....
[when] legislation. .. restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation," or when legislation embodies "prejudice against discrete
and insular minorities... " 304 U.S. at 152-53, n.4.
6. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, found that privacy was within the "penumbra" of the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, which stand "as protection against all government invasions 'of the
sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life."' Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (quoting Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice Brennan and Chief
Justice Warren, stressed that the Ninth Amendment invited the Court to discover enumerated rights
rooted in the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people... " Id. at 493 (Goldberg, J.,
concurring) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). Justice Harlan, rejecting
the need to base Fourteenth Amendment due process claims upon specific Bill of Rights provisions,
found that the statute simply "violates basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' Id.
at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Finally,
Justice White found the statute lacked even a rational relationship to any legitimate government
purpose, apparently concluding that it must fail even under a low-level scrutiny test. Id. at 502-07
(White, J., concurring).
7. Several opinions of the justices in the majority made reference to the significance of the
marital or family relationship. Id. at 485-86, 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White, J.,
concurring). But none of the justices explicitly limited the scope of the right to individuals in a
marital relationship. See id.
8. See, e.g., Paul G. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamental and
Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235, 253 (1965) ("[Plast decisions of the
Court ... offered an immediate opening for finding that marital privacy, as a facet of the freedom of
family life, was a fundamental right."); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom oflntimate Association, 89
YALE L.J. 624, 625 (1980) ("Whatever the constitutional right of privacy may mean in other
contexts, the main object of constitutional protection in Griswold was the marital relationship.").
9. Thus, Professor Karst, who concludes that Griswold was principally concerned with the
marital relationship, goes on to contend that "Eisenstadt," see infra notes 12-18 and accompanying
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The Griswold privacy principle would lead to the 1973 decision of Roe
v. Wade' ° and subsequent legal and political struggle over the existence and
scope of a woman's right to abortion." But a year before Roe, the Court
decided Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 which may have had as much impact on the
development of the privacy right as the much more controversial Roe.
Eisenstadt presented a challenge to a Massachusetts statute that prohibited
the distribution of contraceptives, 3 but unlike the Connecticut statute at
issue in Griswold, the Massachusetts statute extended the prohibition only to
distribution to unmarried persons. 14 Massachusetts contended that the
Griswold principle was limited to protecting the privacy of the marital
relationship."'
The Court rejected this distinction, and struck down the statute.' 6 But
while the outcome of the case seems, on some instinctive level, correct, the
rationales employed by the justices in Eisenstadt seem somehow
insufficient. This is true not only of the justices in the majority, but also of
the dissenters. The core of the Eisenstadt majority argument is set forth as
follows:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in
the marital relationship.
Yet the marital couple is not an
independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an
association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwanted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child. 7
Thus, the rationale of Eisenstadt begins with a clear statement that the
privacy right is held by the autonomous individual; it does not depend on the

text, "follows from Griswold, because the values of intimate association [regardless of the presence
or absence of marriage] are so closely parallel." Karst, supra note 8, at 662.
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

11.

Id. at 129.

12.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

13. ld. at 440-41.
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 272, § 21 (West 2003) (creating a general prohibition on,
among other things, the distribution of contraceptives). Section 21(A), however, created an
exception for a physician, or a pharmacist acting pursuant to a physician's prescription, distributing
contraceptives to any married person. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 441, n.2.
15. The section 2 1(A) exception was enacted to tailor the statute so that it would conform to the
holding in Griswold concerning the marital relationship. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 447-50.
16. The precise holding of the Court was "that by providing dissimilar treatment for married and
unmarried persons who are similarly situated, [the statutes] violate the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
at 454-55.

17. Id. at 453. Thus, while Eisenstadt is formally an equal protection case, see supra note 16,
this statement, which is the most influential declaration in the opinion, makes the case most
significant for its elaboration of the scope of the due process privacy right.

individual being part of any particular relationship. 8 One may disagree with
the contention that rights are independent of relationships, but the position
that they belong to the autonomous individual is hardly surprising in light of
the history of western theory about the source of human rights.' 9 And,
certainly, the proposition that the decision whether to bear a child should be
protected from government coercion is enormously appealing. But did the
Massachusetts statute in question really coerce childbirth?
Massachusetts did not, and certainly would not, maintain that the

purpose of the statute was to promote the birth of nonmarital children.2 °
And, of course, unmarried individuals could avoid the conception of

children by refraining from sexual activity. Clearly, the challengers of the
statute were claiming not a right to be free from coerced parenthood, but
rather a right of sexual intimacy outside of marriage free from

governmentally imposed impediments.2'
Although it is possible that some justices did interpret the GriswoldEisenstadt privacy right to protect all noncommercial, consensual sexual
activity, this position has never been clearly endorsed by a majority of the
Court. Justices in the Griswold majority explicitly pointed out that they
were not endorsing a broad right of sexual freedom. 22 Later, in Bowers v.
Hardwick,23 the Court, albeit by a one-vote margin, rejected a privacy-based
attack on the criminalization of homosexual sodomy,24 a claim that the Court
distinguished from the Griswold line of cases as being unconnected to
childbirth or the traditional family.25 The tension between Bowers and
Eisenstadt, if not between Bowers and Griswold, should be obvious.
Recently, in Lawrence v. Texas, 6 the Court recognized and resolved this

18. See id.
19. For a brief discussion of the background of individual rights thought that provided a basis for
American constitutional thinkers to draw upon, see Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 313(1978).
20. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 448.
21. See generally id.
22. "[I]t should be said of the Court's holding today that it in no way interferes with a State's
proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg,
J., concurring). Justice Goldberg also cites the earlier dissent of Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961), where Justice Harlan distinguishes the State's permissible prohibitions of
"[a]dultery, homosexuality and the like" from "the intimacy of husband and wife." Griswold, 381
U.S. at 499.
23. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
24. The statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984), on its face criminalized all acts of sodomy, but
the Court addressed only "Hardwick's challenge to the Georgia statute as applied to consensual
homosexual sodomy ... express[ing] no opinion on the constitutionality of the Georgia statute as
applied to other acts of sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 nn. 1-2.
25.
IN]one of the rights announced in (prior] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy ....
No connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other has been demonstrated ....
Moreover, any claim that these cases nevertheless
stand for the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting
adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable.
Id. at 190-91.
26. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
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tension by overruling Bowers, and further strengthening the personal
autonomy foundations of the Griswold lines of cases.2 7
Dissenting justices have argued that each extension of the Griswold
principle, and perhaps Griswold itself, is an unwarranted expansion of the
realm of constitutional rights. From the initial argument that Griswold's
recognition of unenumerated fundamental rights was an improper reversal of
decades of due process jurisprudence 28 dissenters shifted in subsequent
cases including Eisenstadt,to arguing that the Griswold principle should be
strictly limited to protect only traditional family relationships.2 9
Should the Griswold-Eisenstadt-Roeline of cases be seen as turning on
individual autonomy or deference to family relationships? While each of
these positions can be credibly defended, neither addresses the central
question presented to the Court in Griswold. In light of the myriad of ways
in which government limits the liberty and autonomy of the individual and
of the family unit,3 ° what is it that compels us to draw the line when
government seeks to limit access to contraceptives in pursuance of a
plausible social benefit?
To understand Griswold and Eisenstadt, we must first recall the
justification that the states in each case put forward, in defense of their
statutes.
Neither Connecticut, in Griswold, nor Massachusetts, in
Eisenstadt, contended that the purpose of limiting contraceptive use was to
increase the incidence of childbirth.3' Instead, they contended that the denial
of access to contraceptives was a rational way to limit illicit sexual relations,
i.e., adultery and fornication.32 In Griswold, this contention was easily
countered by the Court noting that the Connecticut ban, by limiting
contraceptive use by married couples, went far beyond the scope of serving

27. In contrast to earlier cases, however, the Court in Lawrence did not apply a strict scrutiny
analysis, instead finding that Texas had failed to demonstrate that its statute furthered a legitimate
state interest. Id. at 2484.
28. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
29. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 472 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("By relying on Griswold in the
present context, the Court has passed beyond the penumbras of the specific guarantees [of the
Constitution] into the uncircumscribed area of personal predilections.").
30. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (noting that the state may terminate
parental rights upon a showing of neglect by clear and convincing evidence); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (stating that child labor laws may interfere with parental choices
regarding children's work activities); Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (stating that juvenile curfews do not violate parental rights to decide issues concerning
upbringing).
31. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring) ("There is no serious contention...
that the anti-use statute is founded upon any policy of promoting population expansion.");
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 442-43.
32. See Griswold. 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J.. concurring) ("[T]he statute is said to serve the
State's policy against all forms of promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships .... "); Eisenstadt, 405
U.S. at 442 n.3.
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as an anti-adultery measure.33 But that could not be said about the
Massachusetts statute at issue in Eisenstadt; it applied only to unmarried
persons. 34 And with the Court unwilling to hold that a state could not
legislate against fornication, it is not entirely obvious that the connection
between the state's legitimate goal and the means chosen to advance it were
inadequate.
Why, then, does Eisenstadt seem so clearly to be a correct decision?
One way to answer, of course, is to simply affirm what the Court would not,
that is, that noncommercial consensual sexual relations between adults fall
into the zone of privacy given special protection by the Constitution. But in
failing to go so far, yet invalidating the Massachusetts statute nevertheless,
the Eisenstadt Court may not have been acting disingenuously, but rather
affirming that even conceding the non-protected status of fornication, the
state has done something in pursuance of that goal which is extremely
troubling, perhaps even outrageous.
Standard models of constitutional analysis, in this or any other context
involving a rights claim, would have us consider the interests of the party
attacking the government restriction and the interests of the community at
large in upholding the restriction. But Eisenstadt (and Griswold as well)
also implicates a third interest, albeit one that is rather hypothetical. In each
of these cases, the state seeks to deter extramarital sex through the threat of
pregnancy. In other words, the state threatens to impose the extra-judicial
punishment of childbirth, and all of its attendant responsibilities, upon those
committing sexual transgressions.
And, in doing so, the state has,
consciously or not, done something truly offensive. It has decreed that an
entirely innocent person, that is, the child born as a result of the extramarital
affair, shall be regarded as punishment imposed on its parents.
What the prohibition does, therefore, is to treat someone (in this case,
the hypothetical out-of-wedlock child) completely as a means to an end, that
end being the deterrence or punishment of sexual transgressions. The
interests and welfare of the hypothetical child are completely ignored in the
interest of pursuing the social goal. This disregard by the state of the child's
interests should immediately remind anyone who has had even a passing
familiarity with the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant of one of the core
principles upon which that philosophy was built, that an individual may not
properly be regarded entirely as a means to an end, even a legitimate35 end.
Instead, the individual must be regarded as an end rather than a means.
At first glance, this principle seems to fit uneasily, if at all, into the usual
analytical framework applied to constitutional rights claims. Most, perhaps
all, of the tests that courts apply in these cases include elements of utilitarian
concern. In contrast, Kantian ethics is generally regarded as antithetical to

33. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
34. See supra note 14.
35. See infra notes 76-101 and accompanying text. For a concise summary of Kantian ethical
thought, see ROGER J. SULLIVAN, AN INTRODUCTION To KANT'S ETHICS (1994).
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utilitarianism. 36 But American courts clearly avoid either pure utilitarianism
or a pure commitment to the individual. Some degree of balancing is
inevitable, regardless of the problems inherent in employing any balancing
test.
Over the years, constitutional lawyers have attempted to make analysis
of rights claims more determinate by developing tests that would produce
easily predictable, consistent outcomes. But in recent years, these tests have
been breaking down and blurring, leading some to object vigorously to what
appears to be a new, indeterminate era in constitutional rights jurisprudence.
This article will contend that the breakdown in the easy use of categories,
and the increased incidence of balancing in these cases, is, at least in part, a
consequence of courts' recognition of countervailing legitimate values to the
traditional, essentially utilitarian concerns of earlier constitutional cases.
Specifically, this article will attempt to demonstrate the presence, at least
implicitly, in constitutional balancing of the Kantian principle that a person
may not be treated solely as a means to the achievement of some end
independent of that person's own welfare. The recognition of, and respect
for, this principle will by no means banish utilitarian concerns from
constitutional analysis, but it will help to shed light on the factors that courts
do, and must, consider when engaging in the inevitable, if messy, process of
constitutional balancing.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL BALANCING:

A BRIEF

OVERVIEW

For over a century, the Supreme Court has claimed the power to
invalidate state and federal legislation on the grounds that it violated one of
the rights provisions of the Constitution. But none of these provisions is
entirely self-explanatory; almost invariably, the scope of the constitutional
guarantee is subject to legitimate disagreement. Since the Court, in modern
times, has never adopted the suggestion that it defer to the judgment of the
political branches of state and local government in all but the most
indisputable instances of unconstitutionality,37 the legitimacy of the specific
cases in which the Court has exercised judicial review has always been
controversial.
The acts of a decision-maker often appear suspect in the absence of a
clear set of standards for the decision maker to employ. Clear standards,

36. Thus, in contrast to utilitarian thought, Kant maintains that "prudential rules are not fit to
serve as moral rules," and that the pursuit of happiness must be subject to limits imposed by
morality. See SULLIVAN, supra note 35, at 121-24.
37. The notion that courts should defer to legislative judgments on constitutional questions
except where the unconstitutionality is "so clear that it is not open to rational question" has been put
forward by some in an attempt to reconcile the power of judicial review with the commitment to
democracy. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional

Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). But, at least in the twentieth-century, this suggestion has
never been embraced by the Supreme Court.
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even if flawed, give a degree of security by making decisions seem more
predictable and by seeming to limit the power of the decision maker. Early
twentieth-century rights cases failed to produce clearly articulable tests, and
this, perhaps as much as negative reaction to Lochner v. New York 38 and

similar cases, fuels opposition to an active role for courts in overriding
legislative decisions.
In Lochner, a sharply divided Court invalidated a New York statute
regulating the working hours of bakers. 39 The majority and the two
dissenting opinions all began from the premise that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment would invalidate legislation that interfered
with liberty interests if the legislation was arbitrary and unreasonable.4 ° Yet
the justices split over the proper standard for assessing reasonableness. The
clearest standard was that set forth by dissenting Justice Holmes. 41 He
would defer to any legislative judgment that could have come from a
rational legislator, regardless of whether Holmes would have reached the
same conclusion.42
The Lochner majority took a far different approach.43 Without quite
articulating it, the majority seemed to hold that any legislation imposing new
types of restrictions on longstanding liberties would be upheld only if its
promotion of the general welfare was beyond question." Such an approach,
of course, can be seen as coming perilously close to installing the Court as a
third legislative branch.45 Often overlooked is the dissenting opinion of
Justice Harlan, which appears to take a middle ground between the majority
and Justice Holmes. 46 Harlan would defer to the legislature when there was

substantial support for its conclusion that its action furthered the general
would require more proof than Holmes, but less than the
welfare; in short, he
47
Lochner majority.
With this much disagreement in the Court about how to approach due
process claims, it is unsurprising that Lochner would be criticized not

38. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
39. The statute set sixty hours as the maximum work-week. Id. at 52.
40. "In every case that comes before this court... the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair,
reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable,
?" Id. at 56. "[Ulnless the
unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual ...
regulations are so utterly unreasonable ...that the property and personal rights of the citizen are
unnecessarily, and in a manner wholly arbitrary, interfered with ...they do not extend beyond the
ld.
I..."
at 67 (Harlan, J., dissenting). "[Tihe natural outcome of a
power of the State to pass .
dominant opinion [should prevail] ... unless ... a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that
the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles .....Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 52-65.
44. Id. at 68-73 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
45. Thus, statutes meant to protect the health and safety of workers would be struck down, "[i]f
this [health benefit] be not clearly the case." Id. at 61.
46. See id. at 65-74.
47. "'No evils arising from such legislation could be more far-reaching than those that might
come to our system of government if the judiciary, abandoning the sphere assigned to it by the
Id.
I...'
at 74 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
fundamental law, should enter the domain of legislation .
(quoting Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 223 (1903)).
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merely for its outcome, but also for making this area of constitutional law
hopelessly indeterminate.48 Many lawyers erroneously believe that during
the Lochner era, that is, prior to the implicit overruling of the case in the late
1930S, 49 the Court was consistently hostile to government attempts to
regulate the workplace. In fact, the Court's post-Lochner decisions were

quite inconsistent, upholding regulation that appeared reasonable to the

justices 0 and invalidating regulation that struck them as too radical.51

The Court's rejection of Lochner, and its apparent rejection of any
strong protection for "substantive" due process rights, then, can be seen not
only as an endorsement of deference to legislative judgment, but also as an
endorsement of predictability. The Court adopted, in essence, Justice
Holmes' test of reasonableness as the constitutional baseline in most cases.
With a few verbal reworkings, this became the now familiar "rational basis"
test."
To generations of lawyers and law students, application of the
rational basis test would be thought of as almost automatically leading to the

rejection of the constitutional challenge, and the affirmation of the
government action at issue.
But at roughly the same time that the Court was abandoning rigorous

enforcement of substantive due process rights, it was beginning to assert
itself more vigorously in the defense of equal protection and First
Amendment rights.53 That could not be accomplished with the extremely
deferential rational basis test, and so an alternative emerged, which would
become known as "strict scrutiny. 54 The rational basis test required only
that government action be rationally related to a legitimate end. 55 Strict

48. This critique of Lochner was the basis for the rejection by Justice Hugo Black, among others,
of the entire concept of unenumerated constitutional rights. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 507-27
(Black, J., dissenting).
49. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S.
502 (1934).
50. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding maximum hour legislation for
factory workers); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914) (upholding price controls
for fire insurance); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum hour legislation for
women working in laundries).
51. See, e.g.. Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage
legislation for women); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235 (1929) (invalidating price
controls for gasoline).
52. For examples of the Court's application of the rational basis test to economic based
regulation in the post-Lochner era, see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) and
United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
53. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating state racial
discrimination); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (overturning convictions on First
Amendment grounds); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
54. Ironically, the application of strict scrutiny emerged in the only Supreme Court case to hold
that explicit classifications disadvantaging a racial minority were able to satisfy that test. Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the World War II exclusion of Japanese-Americans
from portions of the Pacific Coast).
55. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 425-26 (1961).

scrutiny would also examine government's goals and the means chosen to
achieve them, but would demand that government's purpose be
"compelling," and that the method chosen to achieve it be necessary, rather
than merely rational.56 Although this test was first employed in Korematsu
v. United States,57 a case in which the government prevailed, subsequent
cases would lead generations of lawyers and law students to regard strict
scrutiny as the exact opposite of the rational basis test, that is, almost
impossible for the government to satisfy.
For some time, then, analysis of constitutional rights claims concerning
equal protection, substantive due process, and some First Amendment
problems58 appeared to be primarily a process of classification. Either the
right at issue fell into the relatively short list of those calling for strict
scrutiny, or the longer list of those protected only by the rational basis test.
Once the case had been properly classified, the outcome would be
essentially automatic: the government would lose under strict scrutiny, but
prevail under the rational basis test.
This afforded a certain degree of predictability, but uncertainty
remained with respect to the question of which types of claims should
qualify for strict scrutiny. The use of categories did not eliminate the need
for the Court to engage in the process of balancing; instead it shifted the
process from the "retail" balancing of analyzing individual cases to the
"wholesale" balancing of analyzing broad categories of cases.5 9 The
difficulty and uncertainty surrounding the balancing necessary to classify
categories of cases eventually led to the first steps in the demise of the
seemingly simple and determinate two-level analytical system.
For purposes of equal protection, it was clear that racial classifications
were "suspect" and thus demanded strict scrutiny. 60
Non-suspect
classifications were examined with the less rigorous rational basis test.6' But
did other types of classes, such as those based on gender or out-of-wedlock
parentage, share enough in common with racial classifications to require
similar treatment? Rather than choose between these alternatives, the
Supreme Court forged a third, "intermediate" test. 62 While the creation of a
third category could be seen as a simple refinement in constitutional

56. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
57. 323 U.S. 214(1944).
58. Whether certain types of speech receive full (or any) First Amendment protection has long
been thought to be a function of whether the speech falls into any category entitled to less than full
protection. See, e.g., Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557, 562-63
(1980) ("The Constitution... accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other
constitutionally guaranteed expression."); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that
obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
573 (1942) (refusing to afford absolute constitutional protection to "fighting words").
59. See Donald L. Beschle, Clearly Canadian? Hill v. Colorado and Free Speech Balancing in

the United States and Canada, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 187, 226-27 (2001).
60. See, e.g., Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
61. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307 (1993) (applying rational basis
and upholding challenged law).
62. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based
discrimination).
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analysis, one that might actually promote predictability, this third test would
be far less determinate than its two predecessors.63 At the same time that the
intermediate scrutiny test emerged, the first voices were raised in separate
Supreme Court opinions challenging the concept of clearly defined
64

categories and levels of scrutiny leading to highly predictable outcomes.
Instead, Justices Marshall and Stevens suggested that, at least in equal
protection cases, each case had to be examined on its own, with the Court

asking whether the justification for the challenged classification outweighed

any discriminatory effect.65
While the Court continued to invoke the language of distinct tiers of
analysis, the apparent simplicity of the system has been greatly diminished

over the years. In cases involving affirmative action,66 the Court has chosen

the language of strict scrutiny over the language of intermediate scrutiny,6 7

but justices who provided crucial votes for the Court's majority have
stressed that in their view, strict scrutiny was not to be regarded as the
practical equivalent of the imposition of per se invalidity on government
61
action. 68 Instead, government would sometimes be able to justify even racial
classifications. 69 At the other end of the analytical spectrum, the Court has
found instances where the government has failed to satisfy the rational basis
test of low level scrutiny.7 ° In these instances, the line between the two

63. Compare Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding a draft registration system
requiring males, but not females, to register for possible military service), with United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating Virginia's maintenance of an all-male military college).
64. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("There is only one Equal Protection
Clause .... It does not direct the courts to apply one standard of review in some cases and a
different standard in other cases."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]his Court... has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing
discrimination .... This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care with which
the Court will scrutinize particular classifications.").
65. Craig, 429 U.S. at 212-14 (Stevens, J., concurring); San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 99-100
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
66. See Adarand Constructors, Inc., v. Pena 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
67. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect
and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination."); Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-98; Adarand,
515 U.S. at 218-31.
68. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 237 ("Finally, we wish to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny
is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."') (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., concurring)).
69. Justice O'Connor has gone out of her way to point out that strict scrutiny is not the
equivalent of per se invalidity. "When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling
interest, such action is within constitutional constraints if it satisfies the 'narrow tailoring' test this
court has set out in previous cases." Adarand,515 U.S. at 237; see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325 (2003) (affirming the Bakke approach of applying strict scrutiny, but permitting the
challenged program).
70. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473
U.S. 432 (1985). In each of these cases, the Court invalidated the challenged government act after
finding that it was based upon nothing more than hostility or "impermissible assumptions" toward
the disadvantaged group. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 465.

traditional levels of scrutiny, on the one hand, and intermediate scrutiny, on
the other, has blurred. At the same time, the intermediate scrutiny test has
sometimes been applied in ways that seem quite similar to traditional strict
scrutiny,7' further blurring the distinction. In practice, if not in explicit
language, the Court seems to have at least moved in the direction of case-by-

case balancing in equal protection matters, and away from a process of rigid
classifications.
The same general type of phenomenon has become evident in First
Amendment cases. Categories of speech that were once regarded as outside
the protection of the speech clause, such as "fighting words" 72 or

commercial speech 73 are now given some degree of protection, while at the
same time, the Court has limited speech rights in public places 74 and
balanced the rights of protesters against privacy and other legitimate public
interests.75 With respect to the religion clauses, the Court's Establishment

Clause cases have quite clearly been exercises in balancing conflicting
interests, resulting in a series of outcomes without a great deal of
consistency,76 while recent free exercise cases have abandoned a strict

scrutiny test that seemed, in its application, to be far less severe than what is
normally thought of as strict scrutiny,77 and there has been a return to a low

71. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (invalidating the male-only
admissions policy of Virginia Military Institute). Chief Justice Rehnquist, concurring, expressed
disagreement with the Court's analysis, which seemed to employ something more rigorous than the
intermediate scrutiny test used in prior cases. Id. at 558-59 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
72. "Fighting words" were classified as unprotected by the First Amendment in Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), but in R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-86 (1992),
the Court noted that although such language may have less than full constitutional protection, it is an
overstatement to say that ithas none.
73. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (holding that commercial advertising was
unprotected by the First Amendment). A series of cases has subsequently given commercial
advertising significant protection. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996);
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
74. Earlier cases involving claims of First Amendment access to public property suggested that
the burden was on the state to put forth a convincing reason that access would interfere with
government activity on that property. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972)
("The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time."). More recent cases, however, have adopted an
approach that is quite deferential to government decisions that classify public property as "nonpublic forums," giving government wide discretion to limit the types of speech activity permitted.
See generally Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the
Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713 (1987).
75. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding an ordinance banning picketing
in front of a residence); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC regulations
severely limiting broadcasts of "indecent," but not obscene, speech).
76. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (funding student group's
publication of religious magazine not unconstitutional); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992)
(holding an invocation at high school graduation unconstitutional); County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989) (permitting menorah in public park and prohibiting nativity scene in county
courthouse); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (permitting publicly sponsored holiday display
including religious symbols).
77. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting free exercise claim against
military regulations prohibiting wearing of yarmulke); Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding restrictions on religious group's solicitation of funds
at state
fair).
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level rational basis analysis for any government practice that does not single
out religion for special, disadvantageous treatment. 78
The Court's shift to a more determinate, albeit far less protective,
method for analysis of free exercise claims demonstrates the powerful allure
of clear rules that can serve as guideposts for both government and
individuals in shaping their activity, but it seems that this shift away from a
more indeterminate balancing approach is the exception rather than the rule
in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence. The desire for clearly articulated
tests certainly remains strong. One way to deal with the current proliferation
of approaches in constitutional cases is to suggest that the Court has created
not merely three, but several different "tiers" of scrutiny.7 9 But at some
point, the attempt to articulate a multiplicity of tests begins to look
suspiciously like a rather desperate attempt to deny that much of
constitutional law is moving away from a concern with determinacy and
toward more reliance, openly or otherwise, on case-by-case balancing.
Case-by-case balancing has long been the subject of severe criticism.
Critics maintain that it does not fulfill one of the essential purposes of law,
which is to provide a predictable consistency that will allow people and
institutions to plan their future acts. In addition, balancing is itself a
deceptive term. To balance is to assign relatively precise weights to two
separate things. It is one thing to balance objects to determine their relative
height, weight, or even dollar value.8 ° But the balancing required in
constitutional law requires assigning relative value to very different things.
Just how does one weigh the social benefit
of government practice against
8
the pain it causes one or more individuals? '
Essentially, these criticisms maintain that to permit courts to balance is
to give them a degree of discretion that they should not have. Case-by-case
adjudication has a long history, of course. Courts have developed common
law rules and interpreted statutes without always attempting to do more than
resolve the disputes before them. But one concerned with the proper
allocation of government power will point out that, in these cases, if the
court strikes an unfortunate balance of the interests involved, the legislature

78. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
79. See R. Randall Kelso, Standards of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related
Constitutional Doctrines Protecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern

Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 225 (2002).
80. Of course, even the process of translating values into the common currency of dollars is
hardly without controversy. A homeowner may consider the "fair market value" inadequate
compensation for the exercise of eminent domain in taking the family home. See, e.g., Poletown
Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
81. See Justice Scalia's comment that constitutional balancing is sometimes "like judging
whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).

can correct that judgment. When the issue is one of constitutional
interpretation, the Court's judgment is, for most practical purposes, final.8 2
But it is far too late to reverse the principle that the Supreme Court has
the final say on the constitutionality of government acts, and also far too late
to revert to the century-old suggestion that the Court should adopt as a
single, quite determinate, standard that it will defer to legislative judgment
except in cases where no reasonable person could doubt that the
constitutional text had been violated. 3 And experience has shown that once
these decisions have been made, courts must engage in some form of
balancing. The only questions will be whether the balance will be struck in
each individual case, or for each broad category of cases, 84 and how the
relative weight of the various interests to be balanced will be determined.
Thus, even if courts continue to use the language of strict, intermediate,
or low-level scrutiny, the task of assigning weights to and balancing of
interests cannot be avoided. To what extent have courts accurately
recognized the interests to be weighed in constitutional rights cases?
Generally, the governmental interest in limiting rights has been accurately
identified and assigned a reasonable weight. This should not be surprising;
the value of a government practice to the community can be reasonably
assessed in a utilitarian calculus. Identifying and assigning the proper
weight to the interests of the individual in challenging the government act is
more problematic, but it cannot be avoided. Despite academic argument that
certain rights must be "trumps" that can never be overridden by merely
utilitarian concerns, courts have demonstrated that even the most widely
accepted constitutional rights will be trimmed if the negative consequences
of refusing to do so are severe.85
Still, while no rights are treated as absolutes, it is equally clear that some
require a much greater showing of social harm to justify their limitation.
How do we recognize which rights carry that much weight? The traditional
answer has been either that we simply look to those individual rights
enumerated in the constitutional text, or we engage in an examination of

82. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). It is possible to have a constitutional system that
includes the power of judicial review, yet does not install the judiciary as the final arbiter of
constitutional questions. See, for example, section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, which authorizes parliament or a provincial legislature to provide that an act shall be
effective (with certain limitations) notwithstanding a judicial finding that it violates the Charter,
which is an essential part of the Canadian constitution.
83. This theory was never adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court. See James Bradley
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV.
129 (1893), for the classic enunciation of this theory.
84. See supra notes 58-59 (discussing the use of categories in traditional First Amendment
analysis).
85. Thus, even political speech may be punished "where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Explicit racial discrimination against Japanese-Americans was
upheld in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944), as a military necessity during
World War In. Although Korematsu is now widely regarded as an embarrassing mistake made by
the Supreme Court, the case remains as an illustration of how perceived consequences can cause the
Court to trim even the most strongly protected rights.
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tradition and history to locate fundamental rights.86 These inquiries have
resulted in a short list of fundamental rights, but that list is not exhaustive.
To recognize this is not necessarily to argue for the recognition of "new
rights," but perhaps to suggest examining present and past case law for some
principles that have been overlooked. In order to explore one of those
principles, we must now turn to a source that might seem inappropriate as a
guide to the proper application of any sort of balancing test: the thought of
the great anti-utilitarian philosopher Immanuel Kant.
III.

THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE: TREATING PEOPLE AS ENDS

In weighing claims of individual rights, American constitutional law
pays a great deal of attention to utilitarian concerns. Even the stringent strict
scrutiny test provides for the possibility that a fundamental right might be
overridden if necessary to achieve a compelling social interest. 87 In light of
this, it might seem strange to turn to the thought of Immanuel Kant for any
assistance in understanding American constitutional analysis. Kant's moral
philosophy, after all, is noted for its insistence that justice must be pursued
in each case, regardless of the apparent cost to society. 88 Kant was certainly
no utilitarian.
But if constitutional analysis is largely utilitarian, it is not entirely
utilitarian. Neither the constitutional Framers, nor many judges today,
would endorse Bentham's characterization of individual rights asserted
against community welfare as "nonsense on stilts. '89 Individual rights may
not act as "trumps" over social welfare in all cases, 90 but neither are they
always subservient to community interests. Balancing, then, becomes
inevitable, but at the same time, difficult to do in a way that seems
principled and not simply as a reflection of a particular court's subjective
preferences.
The social cost of respecting a particular rights claim can be determined
in a way that seems reasonably objective. The dollar cost to society, the
number of people who might be harmed or offended, or other things can be
expressed in numbers, and numbers have a reassuring veneer of objectivity.
But the value of an individual right cannot be so easily reduced to a value
that most would agree upon. How can we assign a precise weight to the

86. See supra note 6 (discussing the various theories employed by the justices in Griswold to
justify recognition of a fundamental right of privacy).
87. See supra note 85.
88. For a very good, concise presentation of Kant's moral philosophy, see ROGER J. SULLIVAN,
AN INTRODUCTION To KANT'S ETHICS (1994).
h
89. Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies, in CONTEMP. CIVILIZATION READER (8" ed., 2002-

03). The work is an article-by-article critique of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man.
90. The concept of "rights as trumps" is most closely associated with the thought of Ronald
Dworkin. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205 (1977).
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value of an individual right to obtain an abortion, burn a flag in protest, be
free of an obligation that conflicts with a religious duty, or any number of
other things?
Perhaps a better way to approach the inevitable process of balancing is
not to ask what value to place on a specific right, but rather to identify some

weighty principles that can come into play in assessing the magnitude of a
specific restraint on any number of rights. Kantian ethics can serve as a
promising source for exploring and recognizing such principles.
Like other Enlightenment thinkers, Kant was an opponent of absolutist
government, and believed that the legitimate moral claims of the individual
should override the claims of the state.91 But at the same time, he
recognized that human egoism could, if unrestrained, lead to a state where
the total amount of freedom would be limited by violence and exploitation. 92
Thus, the primacy of the individual should not lead to a radical
libertarianism, but rather to a governing structure that justified its restraints
by demonstrating that it would maximize the opportunities that individuals
had to exercise their legitimate freedoms. 93 A justifiable system of law
would be consistent with what Kant identified as the Universal Principle of
Justice.94 The principle holds that the limitations placed on conduct by law
are just only to the extent that they promote the most freedom for all.95 This
assertion led Kant to the identification of two crucial conclusions that follow
from recognizing the inherent dignity of the individual. The law must
respect the equality of its citizens before the law.9 6 Likewise, the law must
be applied universally, according to impersonal rules that disregard

91. See SULLIVAN, supra note 88, at 7-8. Sullivan sees Kant's political thought as part of the
work of "a group of writers whose philosophical thought underlies the fundamental documents of the
American Republic." Id. at 7. This group includes John Locke, David Hume, Baron de
Montesquieu and others. Id.
92. See id. at 9-11.
93. Thus, the concept of duty would assume a central role in Kant's thought, with the
individual's freedom depending on the duty of others to respect it, and the correlative obligation of
the individual to accord the same respect to others. Id.
94.

IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 56-57 (Mary Gregory trans., 1991).

Gregory, in common with most translators, renders this phrase as "the Universal Principle of Right."
Id. I adopt here Roger Sullivan's use of the word "justice" instead of right. As Sullivan explains:
Today ... people tend to use the term 'right' to canonize whatever it is that they wish to
do. Kant had quite a different meaning for the word: to say that a person has a right is to
say that that person has a legally enforceable claim against others within the context of
civil law.
The term 'justice' rather than 'right' is therefore less subject to
misinterpretation by contemporary readers.
SULLIVAN, supra note 88, at 26 n.5.
95. "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal
law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in
accordance with a universal law." KANT, supra note 94, at 56.
96.
In terms of rights, the attributes of a citizen, inseparable from his essence (as a citizen)
are... civil equality, that of not recognizing among the people any superior with the
moral capacity to bind him as a matter of Right in a way that he could not in turn bind the
other.
KANT, supra note 94, at 125.
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particular conditions that distract from the basic humanity which we all
share, that is the source of individual rights.97
Kant's commitment to the Universal Principle would lead him to
elaborate on matters concerning the proper forms of government,98 but
perhaps better known, and of greater concern to us here, is the norm he
enunciated for the moral conduct of the individual, as well as the recognized
lawgiver, a norm that he called the Categorical Imperative.99 This ultimate
moral standard could be enunciated, in Kant's view, in three different ways,
each presenting a somewhat different emphasis, but each essentially
restating the basic principle.
The first formulation of the Categorical Imperative, the formula of
Autonomy, states that "I should never act except in such a way that I can
also will that my maxim should become a universal law."' ° The second, the
Formula of Respect for the Dignity of Persons, directs that one "[a]ct in such
a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of another, always ...as an end and never ...as a means."' 0 ' The third, and
most abstract, the Formula of Legislation for a Moral Community, provides
that "[a]ll maxims that proceed from our own making of law ought to
harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends as a kingdom of nature."' °2
However much or however little the first and third formulations of the
categorical imperative may have impacted American constitutional law, this
article will limit its scope to focusing on the second. As we will see,
consciously or unconsciously, this principle of refusing to treat the
individual entirely as a means recurs quite frequently not, as Kant would
have wanted as an absolute norm, but nevertheless as a rather strong factor
in weighing constitutional rights cases, even when not specifically identified
as such.
Before attempting to trace the presence of this principle through several
different areas of constitutional rights jurisprudence, it would be helpful to
briefly summarize Kant's own explanation of his formula. The foundation
for this formula, indeed for Kant's entire Categorical Imperative, is his sharp
distinction between persons and things.'0 3 Persons can be distinguished
from both animals and inanimate objects in that they have freedom to
autonomously choose their actions. This ability to legislate the moral law

97. This is at the core of the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative. See infra notes 99100 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., KANT, supra note 94, at 123-49.
99.

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 30 (James W. Ellington

trans.,
100.
101.
102.
103.

3d ed. 1993). This is where the term is first stated. Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 41.
Things can be recognized as having a "market price;" they can be "replaced by something

else as its equivalent." Id. at40. Persons, in contrast, have "an intrinsic worth, i.e., dignity." Id.

for ourselves is what constitutes our humanity, and it is a quality that
animals, operating on instinct, and inanimate objects lack."'
The value of mere things rests entirely on the extent to which they are
prized by persons, and this will depend on the extent to which they provide
practical or emotional utility.'0 5 In other words, things are valuable only to
the extent that they satisfy the needs of those persons desiring them; things
can be and are
legitimately treated as means toward happiness, not as ends in
06
themselves.
In contrast, persons, as free moral agents, can be good not merely in the
sense that they have value to someone else, but objectively, apart from their
subjective worth to others, simply by virtue of their existence. °7 This
intrinsic, objective value that inheres in persons requires that we treat each
other as "ends," rather than merely as means, or objects that can properly be
used solely to satisfy the desires of others.'0 8
This formula, it must be stressed, does not insist upon a saintly degree of
complete selflessness. To begin with, the formula calls upon us to treat
ourselves, as well as others, as ends.' 9 Thus, to treat ourselves as merely
objects to satisfy the desires of others would be not only not admirable, but
actually a violation of the categorical imperative. The pursuit of our own
happiness, within the constraints of the moral law, is entirely proper." 0 And
Kant recognized that since we live in communities and are inevitably
dependent for our flourishing upon our relation with others, we must to a
certain extent use each other for our own ends."' Marketplace and business
transactions, perhaps the most obvious examples of placing subjective
values on the time and skills of others, are not inherently immoral. Kant
defined "worldly wisdom"12 as the skill to influence others in order to use
them for one's own ends."
What is wrong, however, is to treat a person as only a means to
another's ends, to disregard the dignity and worth of the individual and to
treat that person as we would treat a thing. We may treat a thing entirely as
a means to our own ends; it does not command our respect and demand that
its own dignity and well-being be recognized. But a person may be used for

104. Id. at 41 ("[Alutonomy is the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational
nature.").
105. Id. at 40 ("Whatever has reference to general human inclinations and needs has a market
price.").
106. See id. at 35 (noting that things possess only a "relative" or instrumental value).
107. Id. ("Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself and
not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will.").
108. Id.
109. Thus, Kant could not condone suicide. Id. at 36. "If he destroys himself in order to escape
from a difficult situation, then he is making use of his person merely as a means so as to maintain a
tolerable condition till the end of his life." Id.
110. Id. at 37 ("[T]he natural end that all men have is their own happiness..." but this will be
acceptable only if the individual "also strive[s], as much as he can, to further the ends of others.").
111. Thus, there are pragmatic, as well as moral, imperatives, although those lack the dignity of
the latter. ld. at 26-27.
112. Id.at26n.4.
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the ends of another only within the boundaries of respect for that person's
autonomy.
Kant was no utilitarian; his categorical imperative was an absolute rule.
But in its application, he could and did take note of some pragmatic
concerns. Significantly, he did not insist that a moral person must show no
favoritism to family, friends, and neighbors over strangers." 3 It is inevitable
and acceptable to devote particular attention to those closest to us. Still, that
does not permit total disregard for the dignity of strangers. In its actual
application, then, the absolutes of the categorical imperative will not always
provide easy and clear guidance. At what point does legitimate concern for
the ends of oneself and one's community cross the line and treat another
solely as a means of promoting those ends?
The difficulty of providing a clear answer to this question in actual
practice will allow the insights behind the second formula of the categorical
imperative to find their way into the balancing process that courts engage in
when assessing constitutional rights claims. When we examine a range of
Supreme Court opinions, we find, although not explicitly acknowledged, and
not always decisive, the principle that law, while pursuing legitimate
communal ends, may not treat an individual entirely as a means.
IV. THE CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE AS A FACTOR IN CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS CASES

Despite the best efforts of courts and commentators to reduce
constitutional analysis to a set of clear, determinate formulas, most rights
claims are subjected to some form of balancing test.' 14 Whether done under
the name of strict, intermediate, or low-level scrutiny, the process will
involve assigning weights to the value of the asserted right and the social
cost of recognizing that right." 5 It is relatively easy to recognize and
measure social cost; it is much more difficult to accurately assign a
countervailing weight to a particular right.
The difficulty, and apparent subjectivity, of assigning a weight to a
particular asserted right will lead some to argue that only specific rights
expressly listed in the constitutional text should be recognized as having
significant weight in the process of constitutional balancing. This position,
under the banner of textualism' 1 6 or original intent' 17 will take the valuation

113. "For in wishing I can be equally benevolent to everyone, whereas in acting I can, without
violating the universality of the maxim, vary the degree greatly in accordance with the different
objects of my love (one of whom concerns me more closely than another)." KANT, supra note 94, at
246.
114. See supra Part H.
115. Id.
116. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Textualism and Democratic Legitimacy: The Moment and the
Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1085 (1998).

967

of individual rights as a process completed, for good or ill, by the Framers,
and will disclaim judicial power or responsibility to revisit the issue. But
this position must confront the conscious use, by the Framers, of imprecise
language," 18 as well as the inclusion of the Ninth Amendment in the Bill of
Rights." 9 Isn't this strong evidence that the actual intent of the Framers was
that successive generations would continue to explore and debate the precise
boundaries of individual rights?
Rather than asking whether or not a particular practice qualifies as a
fundamental right, which then acquires something close to the status of a
trump over utilitarian concerns, we might identify more general principles
which serve as the basis for specific rights. Government practices that
collide with these principles would, at least, need to be justified by stronger
community welfare concerns than those that satisfy the traditional rational
basis test. But whether a government practice collides with a broad principle
will often be a question of degree, rather than one that calls for a clear yes or
no answer. And, since traditional constitutional analysis calls for an initial
determination of whether or not the asserted right qualifies as a
"fundamental right," a "liberty interest," or something else, the existence and
significance of the underlying principle involved in a case can easily be
overlooked.
Perhaps the clearest example is the approach courts have taken to the
enforcement of the principle of equality. The Fourteenth Amendment makes
it clear, even if notions of fundamental fairness do not, lz° that equal
treatment of citizens by government is a strong underlying constitutional
principle.' 2' But since strong application of the equal protection principle
has traditionally been limited to situations involving recognized fundamental
rights or suspect classifications, more energy has been exerted in trying to
identify those rights or classes than exploring the ways in which the equality
principle itself should be defined and applied. When one does turn to
equality standing alone, apart from suspect classes or the nature of the right
involved, the principle that government not treat a person entirely as a means
provides at least a partial insight into the meaning of the concept.
When we examine a broad range of constitutional rights cases, we can
see that this principle, while rarely if ever stated in so many words, does

117. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation:" The Activist Flight from the
Constitution, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1986); Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guidefor the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
118. Thus, Professor Powell presents a strong case for the proposition that the true intent of the
Framers was that future generations would not be bound by the Framers' narrow "original intent."
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
119. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment:
Foreword,64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 37 (1988).

120. Thus, in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), a companion case to the landmark case of
Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the Court outlawed racial discrimination maintained by
the federal government, despite the absence of an explicit equal protection clause binding the federal
government. The equality principle, the Court held, was implicit in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Boiling, 347 U.S. at 499-500.

121. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[nlor shall any State ... deny to any person ... the equal
protection of the laws").
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seem to be present surprisingly often. Something that closely resembles the
Kantian principle appears, for example, in an area of constitutional rights
analysis far removed from what is normally classified as an equal protection
inquiry.
Since the early twentieth century, the Court has wrestled with the
question of when, if ever, a government regulation of land use that does not
actually deprive the owner of title might constitute a taking, giving the
owner the right to just compensation. 122 Except in a narrow range of
cases, 123 the Court has approached the problem through the use of a rather
indeterminate balancing test. 24 Dominant among the factors weighed in this
test are the percentage of the value of the property reduced by the regulation
in question, 125 and the legitimacy and importance of the government interest
addressed by the regulation. 26 But justices have also addressed the question
of whether the regulation provided a sufficient degree of reciprocal benefit
to the party being regulated, or whether, in contrast, an individual or a small
group of property owners were singled out to bear the full burden of
providing the community with a benefit in which they would share
insufficiently, or not at all.' 27
The recognition and application of this factor in the regulatory takings
cases illustrates both the power and the limitations on the use of Kant's
formula. On the one hand, the assertion that there must be a degree of
reciprocal advantage to justify limitations placed on individuals is the closest
the Supreme Court has come to endorsing the notion that fundamental
principles of justice require that persons not be treated entirely as means to
some utilitarian end. 128 But the fact that the clear presence or absence of
sufficient reciprocal benefits has not been a determinative factor in these
cases strongly suggests that cases where it is clear that the rights claimant is
being treated solely as a means will be rare. Most government activity,
provided that it serves a legitimate purpose, will benefit the community as a
whole; the party subject to the regulation will, to some degree, share in that

122.

See generally WILLIAM FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

(1995).
123. The Court has held that two kinds of regulatory actions are per se takings: when government
action constitutes a "permanent physical occupation" of property, Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982), and where government action deprives a
property owner of "all economically beneficial or productive use of land," Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
124. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
125. "[O]ur test for regulatory taking requires us to compare the value that has been taken from
the property with the value that remains in the property." Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497.
126. See id. at 485-93.
127. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 133-35.

128. Id.
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benefit as a member of the community.129 There is no requirement that there
be a precise reciprocity in the degree of benefits and burdens allocated
among members of the community, only that the individual does not become
solely a means, that is to say, entirely excluded from the benefits. 130 Thus,
for example, the fact that only certain property owners are affected by
having their property designated as a landmark does not invalidate the
restriction; the landowners share in 131
the overall benefits that the community
derives from landmark preservation.
The proposition that the criminal law should punish only the guilty
seems so obviously true that it needs no further explanation. But all
societies at all times would not necessarily agree. Some societies have
punished relatives of the criminal,13 2 and a pure utilitarian would have no
objection to the punishment of the innocent, so long as the in terrorem effect
upon others was sufficient to outweigh the suffering induced by the innocent
who were punished. 133 Such a utilitarian calculus, however, blatantly
violates Kant's second formula. The innocent person here is being used,
quite obviously, as a means. While it might be argued that even the person
unjustly punished is not solely a means, since he will share in the benefits of
a more law-abiding society, the relative weight of the burden and benefit to
that individual makes such a course of action unconscionable.
Punishing the guilty, of course, is not only justifiable, but in Kant's
view, was obligatory. 134 This was not merely a matter of promoting
community welfare; Kant's position was that a punishment approximating
the crime itself was necessary to give respect to the moral choice made by
the criminal. Kant's defense of capital punishment essentially maintained
that by killing another, the murderer had chosen to inhabit a moral realm in
which killing was justified. Executing the killer, then, was an act in which
the state accepted that choice and applied the same principle to the killer
himself.135 This derives from the first formulation of the categorical
imperative. 136 When the killer chose to kill, he must have accepted the right

129. See, e.g., id. at 134-35.
130. See id. at 133-35.
131. Id.
132. See ADEKEMI ODUJIRIN, THE NORMATIVE BASIS OF FAULT IN CRIMINAL LAW 32-33 (1998)

(discussing the evolution of criminal law from regarding the tribe or family as both the victim and
perpetrator of crime to modem concepts of individual responsibility).
133. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules: Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 651-55 (Joel
Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 1991).
134.

See IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 196-98 (photo. reprint 1974) (1887).

135.
[W]hoever has committed [m]urder, must die. There is, in this case, no juridical
substitute or surrogate, that can be given or taken for the satisfaction of Justice. There is
no Likeness or proportion between Life, however painful, and Death; and therefore there
is no Equality between the crime of Murder and the retaliation of it but what is judicially
accomplished by the execution of the Criminal.
Id. at 198.
136. "[T]he undeserved evil which any one commits on another, is to be regarded as perpetrated
on himself." Id. at 196; see also supra notes 93-111 and accompanying text.
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of others to do likewise, and is in no position, then, to object to his own
execution.
Whatever one's opinion is of Kant's position on capital punishment, it
would never justify the execution of any except those actually guilty, no
matter how beneficial the execution might be to community welfare. While
one might strain to justify lesser punishments of the innocent on the grounds
that the person punished would nevertheless benefit in the future from the
general deterrent effects his unjust punishment had on future crime, even
this strained argument is unavailable in cases of capital punishment, where
the innocent executed person will have no share in future social welfare. Of
course, it might be seen as entirely unnecessary to develop a careful
explanation of why the punishment, and certainly the execution, of the
innocent is wrong. Such a conclusion seems self-evident. But while it
would be difficult to find serious advocates of deliberately punishing the
innocent, at least a few commentators have explicitly stated that the
unintentional execution of the innocent was a tolerable price to pay for the
supposed social benefits created by a regime of capital punishment. 37 In a
legal world where utilitarian calculations, not without justification, weigh
heavily, it certainly is worthwhile to reiterate reasons why utilitarian
38
concerns must at least share the stage with other values.1
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality
of statues that, in some way, disadvantage non-marital children. 3 9 In
keeping with standard equal protection analysis, the Court has addressed the
question of whether such children should be recognized as a suspect class,
which would trigger the application of strict scrutiny. 40 This inquiry has
focused on whether the class of non-marital children shared enough
4
characteristics with established suspect classes such as racial minorities,' '
and has not led to consistent results. While some early cases suggested that
1 42
non-marital children are a suspect class for equal protection purposes,

137. See, e.g., Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957.
967 (1985) ("Whether one sees the benefit of doing justice by imposing capital punishment as moral,
or as material, or both, it outweighs the loss of innocent lives through miscarriages, which are as
unintended as traffic accidents.").
138. See Margaret Jane Radin, Proportionality,Subjectivity, and Tragedy, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1165, 1170 (1985) ("Whether someone is guilty of a crime or deserves to die for it is not of concern
to the pure utilitarian. But no one in her right mind is a pure utilitarian.").
139. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
140. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 504-06.
141. Id.
142. In Levy, although the Court did not explicitly adopt strict scrutiny as the appropriate
analytical tool, Justice Douglas' strong language criticizing legislation disadvantaging non-marital
children, and his citation to cases involving racial discrimination suggested that strict scrutiny might
be thought appropriate. 391 U.S. at 70-72.

later cases do not go so far, and apply only intermediate scrutiny, rather than
strict scrutiny, to the challenged classification. 143
If, instead of simply comparing the class of non-marital children to other
suspect classes, we apply Kant's principle to statutes that disadvantage such
children, we find a clearly compelling argument against permitting such
statutes. Discrimination against non-marital children, whether legal or
social, uses these children entirely as a means, presumably toward furthering
the end of reducing the incidence of non-marital childbirth. Most would
agree that reducing the number of unmarried pregnancies is a worthwhile
social goal. But, despite some recent calls for the reintroduction of shame as
a deterrent to unmarried pregnancy,' 44 most would also agree that to punish
the child for what may have been a foolish or socially irresponsible act by
his or her parents is fundamentally unfair. And the unfairness is rooted in
violation of the Kantian principle: to disadvantage non-marital children
based on their parentage is to treat them entirely as means to a utilitarian
end.
While the force of the Kantian principle can be seen in such diverse
places as criminal law and the law of takings, the cases involving nonmarital children bring us into the area of constitutional rights cases that seem
to demonstrate most starkly the power of the principle, even though it is not
explicitly acknowledged. These cases are those that in one way or another
deal with life or death.
At the beginning of this article, the Supreme Court's contraception
cases, particularly Eisenstadt,141 were highlighted as perhaps the clearest
illustrations of the unacknowledged power of this principle. In most cases,
the person claiming a rights violation will be the one who arguably is being
treated as a means rather than an end. The state, in the normal run of cases,
can maintain that the restriction in question in some way benefits, as well as
restricts, the rights claimant, and therefore satisfies the command that no one
be treated entirely as a means. The contraception cases, though, present a
different situation. In addition to the state and the rights claimant, the
prohibition starkly implicates a third person, although that person is offstage
and merely inchoate at the moment the state is concerned with.
In both Griswold and Eisenstadt, the state disclaimed any purpose to
merely promote population growth through its prohibition on
contraception.146 Instead, in each case, the state claimed that its purpose was
to deter extramarital sex through the prevention of pregnancy. 47 While
most of the discussion surrounding the Griswold line of cases has focused on

143. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 275-76, clearly rejects the use of a strict scrutiny standard, in favor of the
intermediate standard of whether the distinction "is substantially related to the important state
interests the statute is intended to promote." Accord Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
144. See, e.g., Charles Murray, The Time Has Come to Put a Stigma Back on Illegitimacy,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 7, 1993, at F1.

145. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
146. See supra note 31.
147. See supra note 32.
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the obviously serious impact that the state statutes had on the lives of those
who sought contraceptives, less attention has been paid to the fact that the
state, in these cases, uses a person, the potential child conceived through
extramarital sex, as not merely a threat, but also a punishment.
Here we may have the most stark example in all of constitutional law of
a case that presents a flagrant violation of the general formulation of the
categorical imperative. The potential child is being used by the state entirely
as a means to deterring the behavior of others; there is not even a pretense of
concern for the good of the extramarital child who might be conceived.
Kant's formula prohibits only actions that treat someone solely as a
means. 148 Usually some plausible argument can be made that the rule in
question, while achieving some utilitarian goals, also benefits the person
whose liberty is restricted. Yet here we need not puzzle over the extent to
which the potential extramarital child is being used as a means or being
benefited as an end. The state does not and cannot genuinely contend that
the ban on contraceptives was in any way meant to further the welfare of
that child. The child was solely used as potential punishment, certainly an
action which should, in terms familiar to constitutional lawyers, "shock the
conscience."
This is not to say that the individual rights of the plaintiffs in the
Griswold line of cases were irrelevant or even unimportant. It is, however,
to suggest that these cases can also be viewed as correctly decided apart
from any effort to enunciate and define a right of privacy or sexual
autonomy. Standard models of constitutional analysis demand that an
individual right of the plaintiff be identified, but in these cases that obscures
perhaps the most objectionable aspect of the challenged statute.
A similar phenomenon can be seen in another branch of substantive due
process cases, those asserting a "right to die." Unlike in Griswold and
Eisenstadt, here the principle of treating people only as ends rather than
means did not lead to broad endorsement of the asserted right, but rather
emerged in the cautious ways in which five of the justices dealt with their
rejection of the claim.
In Washington v. Glucksberg,1 49 the Supreme Court unanimously
rejected the claim that a state prohibition on assisted suicide violated the
privacy or autonomy rights protected by the Due Process Clause. 5 ° The
outcome was unsurprising, especially in light of the Court's earlier decision
in Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,'5 ' where the Court upheld the
power of the state to set a high standard of proof to establish that a comatose

148.
149.
150.
151.

See supra text accompanying notes 103-13.
521 U.S. 702 (1997).
Id. at 735.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
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patient would want life support mechanisms discontinued. 5 2 Cruzan
strongly suggested that a majority of the Court did recognize that a
competent patient has a due process right to discontinue treatment 53 but the
precise holding, and the general tenor of the decision certainly indicated that
the Court intended to proceed with extreme caution in extending the privacy
right in this context.
The Court's refusal to recognize a right to assisted suicide was easily
predictable. But the most interesting aspect of Glucksberg is the cautionary
note sounded in the separate opinions of several justices. While rejecting the
challenge to the Washington state statute, these justices noted that the state
interpreted the law as permitting the administration of palliative care, that is,
the administration of drugs in order to lessen pain, despite the fact that these
drugs may have the concurrent effect of shortening the patient's life. 154 This
position, somewhere between the denial of any constitutional problem
presented by the assisted suicide issue, on the one hand, and the assertion of
an absolute right to end one's life, on the other, is problematic when viewed
through the lens of the traditional levels of constitutional review.
If we apply low-level scrutiny to the assisted suicide claim, the caveat
about palliative care seems unnecessary. In rejecting the claim, the Court
focused on the legitimate purpose of government to prevent abuse of assisted
suicide; 155 allowing it even under the relatively careful guidelines proposed
by the Washington patients' advocates would create too great a potential for
its use where the patient was coerced, uninformed, or otherwise distinct from
the model of the autonomous decision-maker at the heart of the plaintiff's
case. 156 But under strict scrutiny, the state could not justify keeping the
intelligent, competent, fully informed terminal patient from exercising his
fundamental right on the ground that others might abuse that right. Strict
scrutiny demands the least restrictive alternative, not merely a broad
prohibition affecting157 the competent and vulnerable equally, as does the
Washington statute.
But if we replace, or at least supplement, the traditional analytical tools
with the principle that a person not be treated merely as a means, the
position of the several concurring justices becomes easily understandable.
The basic reasons given for outlawing assisted suicide do not rest on the
state's authority to keep someone alive against their true wishes. Instead,

152. Id. at 286-87. Missouri required "clear and convincing evidence of the patient's wishes" to
have life sustaining treatment withdrawn, rather than a mere preponderance, or permitting relatives
to make the choice for incompetent patients. Id.
153. The Court "for purposes of this case... assume[d] that the United States Constitution would
grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition." Id. at 279. It seems clear that concurring Justice O'Connor and the dissenting justices
would affirm such a right. See id. at 287-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 304-05 (Brennan. J..
dissenting).
154. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 750-52 (Stevens. J.,
concurring); id. at 780 (Souter, J., concurring); id. at 791-92 (Breyer, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 733.
156. Id. at 730-33.
157. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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they tend to rest on the danger that patients will be euthanized against their
true wishes, due to coercion, lack of full knowledge, misunderstanding, or
otherwise."5 8 And if this is so, to prohibit an individual from seeking
assisted suicide can be seen as at least partly an effort to protect that
individual, as well as the community."5 9 While this aspect of the purpose
behind the prohibition might be criticized as paternalistic,16° it does
demonstrate a concern for the individual seeking assisted suicide as well as
others in the community who might also be coerced or otherwise improperly
euthanized in the future. In short, the rights claimant being denied assisted
suicide is not being treated solely as a means to the achievement of
utilitarian ends. 161
When the state goes so far as to prohibit palliative care, however, the
analysis changes dramatically. To deny palliative care is not merely to deny
the choice of an earlier death, but also to require the terminally ill patient to
continue to suffer serious pain. It is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain
that this is actually being done to benefit the patient. Instead, the denial of
palliative care seems entirely motivated by the desire to deliver a strong
message to the community about the value of preserving life, or at most the
desire to establish a bright line prohibition to prevent abuse of the
acceptance of palliative care to shield those who would use drugs to
euthanize patients in situations not involving pain reduction for the
terminally ill. In short, this seems to present a situation in which the Kantian
formula is violated. The patient is being forced to endure serious pain as a
means of achieving some broad social gain, in which the patient himself will
not share.
Medical treatment was also at issue in the most recent Supreme Court
decision that suggests the importance of the Kantian formula. In Sell v.
United States, 62 the Court held that a criminal defendant may sometimes be
forcibly medicated to make the defendant competent to stand trial. 63 This
will only be allowed, however, when certain conditions are met.' 64 The
state's important interest in bringing the defendant to trial must be
unattainable by less intrusive means. 65 And the use of the medication must
be in the best medical interest of the defendant, and be unlikely to itself

158. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 734 (discussing the Dutch experience with legal voluntary
euthanasia).
159. Id. at 729-30.
160. BERNARD GERT, CHARLES M. CULVER & K. DANNER CLOUSER, BIOETHICS: A RETURN To
FUNDAMENTALS 195 (1997) ("Paternalism may be the most pervasive moral problem in medicine.").
161. Id. at 197 ("Of course, P's actions can be partially paternalistic; they can be intended for the
benefit of others, including P himself, in addition to S. But what makes P's actions toward S
paternalistic is never the intended benefit to anyone other than S.").
162. 123 S. Ct. 2174 (2003).
163. Id. at 2184-85. 2187.
164. Id. at 2184-85.
165. Id. at 2185.
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cause side effects that might compromise the fairness of the defendant's
trial. 166
Those restrictions reflect the principle of not treating an individual
entirely as a means. While the government may act to promote social
welfare in its prosecution of the accused, the medication must be at the same
time of medical benefit to the accused. 167 Even if the welfare of the accused
is secondary, at best, in the mind of the state officials, it cannot be entirely
ignored. The same principle can be seen in the century-old Supreme Court
decision upholding the state's power to compel citizens to receive
vaccinations against communicable diseases. 68
While this might be
defended simply by asserting that the social good outweighs the burden
placed on individual bodily autonomy, the fact that the program seeks the
welfare of the vaccinated individual as well as the greater community seems
central to the program's justification. 6 9
V. CONCLUSION

Both law and moral philosophy have long sought to frame both rules
and analytical methods that would provide clear guidance and a certain level
of determinacy in resolving dilemmas in each field. But in law, at least, the
frequent sharp tension between utilitarian concerns and "matters of
principle"'' 70 has never been entirely resolved in favor of either, but has
instead led to various forms of balancing in constitutional cases.
Balancing requires the identification and weighing of competing
interests. The utilitarian side of the scale usually presents little problem
here; community welfare can usually be identified and weighed, if not
precisely, with at least rough accuracy. More difficult is the identification
and weighing of individual rights principles. Why are there such rights, and
how heavily do they weigh when balanced against social goals that might be
advanced by overriding them? As the Supreme Court's approach to these
questions has evolved, standard analytical practice has been to try to define
discrete individual rights that may be limited only when their importance is
clearly outweighed by competing social imperatives. This approach leads to
the creation of several different, somewhat isolated, areas of law focused on
each right, such as free speech, privacy, or property rights.

166. Id. at2184-85.
167. Id. at 2185.
168. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11(1905).
169. Id. at 26-27.
170. Although the Jacobson opinion emphasizes the need to weigh the welfare of the community
against the right of the individual to be free of unwanted vaccination, it does go on to note:
[S]uppose the case of an adult who is embraced by the mere words of the act, but yet to
subject whom to vaccination in a particular condition of his health or body, would be
cruel and inhuman in the last degree. We are not to be understood as holding that the
statute was intended to be applied in such a case, or, if it was so intended, that the
judiciary would not be competent to interfere and protect the health and life of the
individual concerned.
Id. at 38-39.
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This tendency to isolate rights questions from each other has even
spilled over into analysis of the constitutional demand of equality, a
principle that obviously cuts across a wide range of private and public
action. Here the common practice is to initially identify a class of people or
a substantive right that is entitled to special care in assuring equal treatment
by government, and develop a separate body of law for each one.
To some extent, this approach is inevitable, but it may obscure the
existence of constitutional principles, whether rooted in the concept of
equality, or of the just treatment demanded by the Due Process Clause, that
should, and often do, play a role in a broad range of litigation pursuing rights
claims. One of those principles appears to be the second formulation of
Kant's categorical imperative.
The use of Kant's categorical imperative as a tool to assist in balancing
will seem strange at first glance; Kant, after all, is the advocate of moral
absolutes. And there are few, if any, constitutional rights principles that are
actually applied as absolutes. Yet when we look at the second formulation
of the imperative, with its qualification that using another solely as a means
is always wrong, we find, in the use of term "solely," evidence that the
formula in its application will require a sort of balancing. To what extent
does a restriction benefit the individual; to which extent is that individual
excluded from a share in societal benefits? Invocation of the principle will
be not inconsistent, then, with the almost inevitable process of balancing that
courts must engage in when considering individual rights claims.
The recognition of Kant's second formulation as a principle deserving
respect in constitutional rights analysis will not necessarily make
constitutional decision-making any more determinate. In some cases, the
principle will be of little, if any, assistance. For example, each side in the
abortion debate will lay claim to the principle, invoking it to either defend
the asserted rights of the women or the fetus. The categorical imperative is
of no help in resolving the basic question of whether a fetus can claim
personhood, and the respect that status demands.
In other cases, respect for the principle will not change outcomes, but
will instead provide a better understanding of current legal doctrine, and a
stronger basis for its defense and development. This seems especially true
with respect to some contentious issues involving post-Griswold assertions
of strong rights of individual autonomy. But even in other contexts, the
principle that the individual should never be treated solely as a means to the
satisfaction of another's ends provides a useful tool in the imprecise, but
unavoidable, process of constitutional balancing.
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